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ONIGHT I have been asked to discuss with you for a few minutes the
question, "Should Banks Be Required to Adopt the Reporting Requirements of the S E C ? "
Let me be brief. The answer to that one, at least i n my opinion, is
an unequivocal yes. But, is the answer that simple? F o r a few minutes,
let us consider the recent legislation affecting bank reporting.
About one hundred years ago an event took place that has had a
profound effect on the banking industry. That event was the approval
by President Lincoln of the A c t of February 25, 1863, providing for a
system of national banks chartered and supervised by the Comptroller
of the Currency, under the general direction of the Secretary of the
Treasury. This A c t , known as the National Currency A c t , and referred
to by many as the Free Banking B i l l , attracted scant notice i n the
Nation's press of that day; as a matter of fact, i n one N e w Y o r k City
daily it was covered by the following three-line insert i n a column on
Washington miscellany:
The Free Banking B i l l , it is understood,
was approved by President Lincoln
early i n the week.
In spite of the lack of publicity, I am sure that everyone in this
room will agree with me that, with the stroke of a pen, President Lincoln
set in motion a chain of events that i n time helped to stabilize and
strengthen the Nation's economy. Regulation, i n short, has been healthy,
for the aims of the federal government i n its supervision of banks has
been to protect depositors' funds and to assure the ability of banks to
continue service to their communities.
On August 20, 1964, just a little over a hundred years after the
signing of the National Currency A c t of 1863, President Johnson
signed into law the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 whereby,
among other things, public disclosure provisions concerning certain
financial information became applicable to unlisted corporations having
$1 million or more of assets and 750 or more stockholders of a single
class. These provisions extend to the banking industry.
This A c t , unlike the 1863 A c t , has received reams of publicity,
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particularly as it affects the banking industry; but like the 1863 A c t ,
its effect on the industry will also be profound, as it now appears.
Changes in the industry during the past hundred years have been
many, and few would deny that change many times contributes greatly
to growth and strength and usefulness.
H o w will this legislation affect the industry? The Congress has
now told an important sector of industry to change its attitudes and
policies on accounting.
A s background, the powers, functions, and duties vested i n the
Securities and Exchange Commission to administer and enforce the
Acts with respect to the securities of banks are transferred to the federal bank supervisory agencies. These agencies, and the banks reporting
to them, are:
AGENCY
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ( F D I C )
Comptroller of the Currency
Securities and Exchange
Commission

BANK
State-chartered banks that are
members of Federal Reserve
State-chartered banks insured
by F D I C but not members
of the Federal Reserve
National banks
A n y other bank not covered
by the above-mentioned

Let me repeat, however, that the Acts apply only to those banks with $1
million or more i n assets and 750 or more stockholders of a single class.
Banking analysts have estimated that about 600 of the country's 14,000
banks are affected by the legislation, of which approximately 200 are
State-chartered members of the Federal Reserve, 100 are State-chartered non-member banks, and 300 are National banks. I n these figures,
however, we may find an anomaly, which to me as a professional
accountant is most disturbing. The nationally chartered banks that are
required to register their securities may do so by filing with the Comptroller's Office two copies of their annual report, whereas State-chartered banks and members of the Federal Reserve must comply with
Regulation F .
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 were put together after
the S E C made its study of the securities markets and issued its huge
report entitled Report of a Special Study of the Securities Markets.
The Banking authorities, namely, the Federal Reserve and the F D I C ,
favored the b i l l ; the lone dissenter was the Comptroller of the Currency,
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James J . Saxon, who felt that the Act's provisions were not needed for
banks; however, in all fairness, he favored the principle of disclosure.
H e felt that the bill was not needed inasmuch as the various authorities
already had the authority to act. But, have they acted? It is fair to say
that most of the supervisory authorities have issued regulations and
rules that have been primarily for depositor protection rather than for
stockholder protection.
William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System when the congressional hearings on the
bill were being held i n 1963, stated:
The commercial banking system is one of the most closely supervised
industries in the United States, subject to numerous laws and regulations, detailed examination, and requirements of reports to bank supervisors, both State and Federal. The objectives of bank supervision,
however, are fundamentally different from those of the Securities
Exchange Act.
Bank supervision is intended to assist in maintaining a sound, serviceable banking structure and to protect bank depositors. A s an incident
to these principal functions, supervision also benefits bank shareholders
in important ways.
Nevertheless, most of the information about a bank that is developed
by the supervisory authorities must necessarily be treated by them as
confidential, and the data now available to a bank's shareholders or
prospective shareholders do not appear to provide all that they would
need in order to make sound investment decisions.
A s all of us i n this room are aware, banks have over the years
employed accounting methods or practices that in their judgment have
best suited their purposes. Bank accounting i n the past generally has
been influenced by panics, bank failures, the bank holiday of 1933, et
cetera, and hence the emphasis swung to depositor protection. The
enactment of insured deposit legislation and the emphasis on conservative banking practices illustrate the trend. Some of these practices
were:
1) Listing of Debits and Credits, which by some was called a
statement of condition and was made available for depositors, stockholders, and prospective stockholders. It was an extreme rarity to find
published Income Statements as we know and think of them.
2) Fixed assets often were written down; furniture and fixtures
were charged off to expense and no depreciation taken.
3) Reserves were used to conceal income. Many times provisions
were made to increase reserves i n good years so as to take care of losses
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in poor years; reserves were then a convenient method of income
equalization. Items of income and expense have i n the past been masked
by transfers to or from reserves. I suppose that i n the minds of some
bankers such a practice contributed to the maintenance of stability.
4) A s to investments, banks have traditionally shown securities
at cost less amortization of premiums—premiums amortized to the
earliest call or maturity date. Bankers have operated under the philosophy that they are not i n the business of buying and selling securities
but of lending money through credit. The movement i n their portfolios
occurs because of the rise and fall of lending requirements. A s a result,
premiums paid on securities purchased have been amortized, but discounts on purchases have not. Thus, as to discount items, income is
recorded on a coupon basis rather than on a yield basis.
Listed below are some of the accounting treatments that commercial banks i n the past frequently followed with respect to premiums and
discounts on securities.
a) Neither premiums nor discounts on purchases were amortized.
b) Premiums only were amortized.
c) Both premiums and discounts were amortized.
d) Both premiums and discounts were written off immediately.
e) Premiums only were written off immediately.
f) Discounts only were written off immediately.
g) Some premiums were amortized and some premiums were
written off immediately.
h) Both premiums and discounts were amortized on U . S . government securities only, and premiums only were amortized on
the remaining securities.
T o an accountant this diversity is perplexing to say the least. The
examples cited are several of many—and it may be true that banks i n
the past have had almost as many different accounting practices as
Cleopatra had charms. A r e such practices logical from the viewpoint
of the stockholder—from one who expects to invest i n the securities of
a bank? Has there been a double standard? I'm sure you will agree
with me that the banker i n making loans expects to receive from his
customer adequate financial information, and in many cases requires
our opinion on such statements. Should the banker be excused from
good accounting and reporting practices, especially when one considers
that the banks may be competing for capital funds, debenture issues,
equity, etc?
What has been the effect of Regulation F ?
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1) It is significant, I believe, that the banking industry, through its
associations such as the American Bankers Association, N A B A C , the
New Y o r k Clearing House, et al., has been working diligently since
enactment to find further agreement on certain difficult accounting
problems.
2) Some of the country's leading bankers have taken the position
that banks should show the way i n making their reports to stockholders
clear and consistent so that investors can make an intelligent judgment.
In short: A stockholder of Bank X , or a person who is wondering
whether to buy its stock, should be able to find out readily what sort of
business the bank conducts, what its assets and liabilities are, the sources
of its revenues, and the amount and trend of its earnings, and the
many other things that an intelligent investor considers before deciding
whether to buy, retain, or sell a security.
The principle laid down by the Securities A c t of 1933 was that no
one could sell a new security to the public unless the public was first
supplied with a prospectus outlining the important facts about the
corporation—its business, its financial condition, the people who ran it,
and its results of operations to date. The banks however were exempt.
F o r thirty years banks escaped this impact. N o w , however, it
appears that full disclosure is here to stay as far as the banking industry
is concerned. The composition of investors i n bank securities has, like
many other things, changed i n the past quarter century. Bank stocks
are no longer owned only by the relative few; the large middle class as
well as the wealthy invest i n bank equities. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 legislation as applicable to banks was inevitable as i n the
public interest.
A s accountants we nevertheless criticize some of the things i n the
present regulations—provisos that differ i n intent from generally accepted accounting principles. A partial list would include:
1) Market value of securities—Under
present regulations, market values of bonds of investment grade need not be disclosed. I n my
opinion market value of all bonds should be disclosed for two reasons:
(a) to permit the reader to evaluate investment earning power, and (b)
to permit the reader to evaluate the portfolio transactions.
2) The accounting for stock dividends—Banks generally transfer
from earned surplus to capital surplus only the par value of the dividend. Under a generally accepted accounting principle the transfer
would be made at market value and surplus account charged therefor.
3) Provisions for bad debts—These charges, usually the full
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amount permitted for tax purposes, now are all below the net operating
earnings line, "net of tax."

Although we admit this is an improvement

over former practices, it leaves something to be desired. A t least that
part representing management's best judgment of possible loss should
be charged to operating earnings.

T h e bad debt is a cost of doing

business.
4) Recognition

of deferred

taxes—Banks

presently follow no uni-

form practice in providing for deferred taxes—some make provision
and some do not. I see no reason why all banks should not do so.
5) All-inclusive

income

statement—Regulations

captioning the final figure as Net Income

fail

for the Year.

to call

for

Traditionally,

however, the banker has considered net operating earnings to be more
important.
6) Security

profits

and losses—Treating

this item as a non-oper-

ating item is in my judgment acceptable as a bridge for the time being
between former practice of reserving gains against the contingency of
future losses from investments and loans, and including gains and losses
in income.
The new era of bank reporting is here and is here to stay, and its
capstone is full and fair dsclosure.
As

is well known, bank reports need not contain an independent

accountants' opinion since the regulations do not require one.

Among

the major New Y o r k banks, however, there appears to be a strong
movement for change in this regard. A l l except one will have opinions
from independent accountants in their annual reports for 1965.

This

trend is a challenge to our profession and we should therefore respond
to it. The response should be with one thought in mind—that of rendering a service in accordance with a high standard of excellence.

